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390 Faith and Philosophy 
gram to try to work out an account of the psychology of the sort of deity 
whose existence it depends on, including all its higher-order preferences, 
but we cannot assume in advance that this research program will succeed. 
And there is a salient difference between the two cases. We do understand 
how a research program in human psychology with moral realist ideas in 
its hardcore might progress or degenerate. It is, however, difficult to imag-
ine how a research program in divine psychology that would deliver the 
goods Carson needs could ever be anything more than sheer speculation. 
Nature, Design and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science by Del 
Ratzsch, State University of New York Press, 2001, x + 220, $40.00. 
PATRICK RICHMOND, St Catharine's College, Cambridge 
This book aims, not to address the question of whether the natural 
world is designed, but rather whether science is in principle able to accom-
modate the concept of supernatural design. 
Ratzsch develops the definition of design and relates it to anthropology 
and the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, before analysing the con-
cept of supernatural design. He then investigates where the true bound-
aries of scientific legitimacy lie. He concludes that standard attempts to 
rule out design in principle fail and that there might be potential scientific 
pay-offs in allowing the possibility of supernatural design. 
Ratzsch takes design to be the result of deliberate agent activity inten-
tionally aimed at generating particular patterns. Pattern is to be under-
stood in terms of structures that have special affinities to cognition. 
Design results in artefacts that can usually be recognised because they 
exhibit 'counterflow,' marks of agent activity, features which mindless 
natural processes would not produce. Ratzsch argues that science is quite 
capable of recognising artefacts. For example, the search for extra-terres-
trial intelligence (SET!) is the search for energy artefacts. Thus science 
could legitimately investigate the theory that aliens intentionally pro-
duced life on earth. 
Ratzsch then investigates supernatural design. He notes that a supernat-
ural being could intentionally produce artefacts identical to those pro-
duced by finite, natural agents. Additionally, supernatural beings could act 
in ways that break natural laws. They could affect quantum probabilities, 
as well as create things from nothing, including natural laws, constants 
and primordial initial conditions. A complicating factor is that if an agent 
creates an element of nature itself then there is no possibility of comparison 
with what nature does unaffected by intentional agency. Supernatural cre-
ation may therefore not show the primary marks of agent activity and 
counterflow usually associated with the artefacts of finite agency and so 
may be harder to identify. 
Ratzsch argues that complexity and improbability alone are not strong 
evidence of design (a random set of craters on the Moon might be highly 
complex and improbable but not suggest design). However, complexity 
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that generates or supports valuable outcomes or patterns can be strong evi-
dence of design (an extreme example of the latter would be the pattern of 
craters on the Moon spelling out John 3:16). Actively functioning, self-
maintaining, complex structures and systems, such as are found in living 
organisms, intuitively suggest design, show striking patterns and are 
linked to things we value such as life, health and consciousness. They 
therefore offer some evidence of design. Ratzsch explicitly avoids the ques-
tion of how we might assess the strength of this evidence. 
Turning to the question of the boundaries of scientific legitimacy, 
Ratzsch points out how recent philosophy of science emphasises that sci-
ence is not a purely empirical procedure. It also relies on human percep-
tion and understanding and non-empirical values like simplicity. Bans on 
supernatural design therefore can not be based on naive, empiricist con-
ceptions of science. 
Ratzsch argues that naturalistic definitions of science can not be arbi-
trary. If science seeks the truth about reality then some reason is needed to 
restrict it to merely natural explanations. Assuming that such a restricted 
science is true comes close to assuming philosophical naturalism. Ratzsch 
thinks that methodological naturalism stems from a fear that the supernat-
ural will undermine scientific method and from the supposed success of 
naturalistic theories. 
Ratzsch proposes that science must be sensitive to empirical findings. 
Furthermore, scientists must assume that empirical findings reveal under-
lying feahlres of nature. Scientists do not need to be able to control every 
factor, but if they were unable to recognise or predict the operation of 
extraneous factors then they would face serious problems. Extraneous fac-
tors could hide the underlying principles of nature and scientists could 
shield any theory from empirical falsification by appeal to hidden vari-
ables. Ratzsch then claims that if there is a justification for excluding the 
supernatural from science then it must be that it undermines the necessary 
assumptions scientific method must make. 
Ratzsch reviews some cases for prohibiting appeal to the supernatural. 
The prohibition cannot rest on definition, since there is no completely satis-
factory formal definition of science available. He responds to complaints 
that supernatural design theory is not falsifiable by noting that there are 
difficulties with the criterion of falsification and that, conceivably, counter-
evidence could falsify such theories. Another objection to the supernatural 
is that it cannot be controlled, yet many natural phenomena cannot be con-
trolled but can still be scientifically studied. Intelligent design can still be 
recognised without being controlled (Ratzsch gives the example of an 
alien, titanium cube found on Mars). Supernatural design need not be hid-
den or unidentifiable, and so may admit of scientific study. Another fre-
quent objection to design theories is that they are hyperflexible, that is, they 
are compatible with almost any data. Here Ratzsch points out that various 
high-level scientific theories, such as evolution and Newtonian physics, are 
compatible with various data. A related objection is that supernatural 
design has no real predictive power. Ratzsch responds in three ways. First, 
we are often not in a good position to predict the actions of agents but we 
may still recognise agent activity. Second, the idea that there is one creator 
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who works to a principle of uniformity of design might lead to predictions 
of, for example, a single basic DNA Dictionary in the Cosmos. Third, the 
predictions of supernaturally linked theories can be as precise as one likes. 
Many complain that supernatural design theories invoke a 'God of the 
gaps', that such gap arguments are destructive of scientific procedure and 
that their track record is dismal. Ratzsch responds that many design argu-
ments did not involve gaps in natural causation and that there are 
respectable scientific projects searching for things nature cannot do, such as 
SET!. Furthermore, some gaps may be considered closed merely because of 
an arbitrary prohibition on design explanations. Even if all gaps have been 
legitimately closed so far, this could not establish the claim that gaps will 
never be found. Even if it is a sensible rule of thumb to assume no gaps, 
this should not be allowed to override a solid, empirical case for natural 
impossibility . 
Next Ratzsch responds to objections based on God's infinitude. He 
notes that there is no absolute bar on infinite values in science, such as infi-
nite age. Further, every theory plausibly makes claims, not only about 
what will happen, but also about what would happen and thus goes far 
beyond mere data. In responding to claims that miraculous events under-
mine science he argues that miracles need present no particular problem, 
so long as they can be recognised. 
Some claim that design theories have had their chance historically and 
have failed. Ratzsch notes that this would not generate an absolute prohibi-
tion. Not all design theories can be said to have failed. Darwinian evolu-
tion may have undermined some gap theories of design but not theories 
claiming that fundamental natural laws or initial conditions are designed. 
Furthermore, the detailed historical work necessary to justify the historical 
claim is often left undone. 
Ratzsch argues that design in nature must ultimately be explained by 
direct agent activity. If life displays design-like patterns then saying that 
natural laws and processes produced them would not remove the need for 
explanation. We should still seek for an explanation of why nature pro-
duces design-like patterns. Natural processes may generate design-like 
patterns but this does not show that undesigned things produce design-
like patterns, for natural processes may be designed. Features like cosmic 
fine-tuning, the comprehensibility of nature, and the complexity of organ-
isms invite design explanations and the burden of proof is on those who 
would prohibit them. 
Some respond to such claims by asking what explains the supernatural 
designer. Ratzsch responds that it is not necessary to be able to explain the 
designer to be able to justifiably offer a design explanation. If a perfect cube 
of pure titanium was found on Mars then it would invite an explanation in 
tem1S of design, even if we had no idea where the designer came from, or 
how they had manufactured the cube. 
Ratzsch believes that, were design theories to offer significant scientific 
benefits, most scientists would cheerfully jettison prohibitions on design 
concepts, just as they abandoned prohibitions on action at a distance when 
offered the benefits of Newtonian gravitational theory, and accepted inde-
terministic laws when confronted with the success of quantum mechanics. 
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He suggests that design might operate at a comparable level to the prin-
ciple of the uniformity of nature; this principle is metaphysically rooted, 
non-negotiable, normative, systematically protected, immune to empirical 
challenge, non-predictive and unlimitedly flexible. It is thus 'guilty' of vir-
tually the entire catalogue of charges against the idea of supernatural 
design, yet it is essential to science. Historically, the idea of creation and 
design justified key presuppositions, such as the uniformity of nature and 
the universality of Natural Law, the comprehensibility of nature and the 
use of criteria like simplicity and beauty in theory evaluation. Design also 
helped generate the machine model of nature and stimulated various 
researchers. Design thus offers to integrate many of the essential presuppo-
sitions, justifications and motivations of science, and might spur one to 
continue to look for pattern underlying apparent randomness and be will-
ing to abandon demonstrably failing research programmes assuming natu-
ralistic causes. 
The main argument that science need not exclude supernatural design 
seems persuasive. However, the focus on legitimacy in principle is a little 
Lffisatisfying. There is little evaluation of design in comparison to naturalis-
tic theories. Ratzsch thinks he has, among other things shown the permissi-
bility of 'God-of-the-gaps' -style theories, but he has done little to make 
them scientifically attractive in the current context. An attraction of a natu-
ralistic theory of biological origins is that it offers a unified, elegant 
account. Accounts of biological origins in terms of supernaluraluLterven-
tion also include natural process and microevolution and so are, in this 
respect, more complex and less elegant and attractive. In addition, evolu-
tionary accounts offer some helpful perspectives on apparently flawed 
designs in nature such as the appendix of the human digestive system or 
the lumbar region, both prone to dysfunction. Such structures look more 
like variations on animal precursors than good designs produced from 
scratch. Ratzsch does not much explore how design theorists might deal 
with such apparent bad designs and competing theories, let alone offer a 
theodicy for natural evil. At most he briefly appeals to human ignorance. 
Unfortunately, in the scientific context, with explanation and understand-
ing at a premium, and competing theories of origins available, reliance on 
ignorance is disadvantageous. Ratzsch argues cogently that science could 
in principle accommodate the idea of supernatural design, but questions of 
fact go unanswered. 
